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Abstract  
This paper aims to analyze the energy subsidy removal on the households’ welfare in 
Indonesia. First, we will model theoretically the welfare change measurement. In this 
paper, we will apply Compensating Variation (CV) and Equivalent Variation (EV) 
under Linear Expenditure System (LES). Second, we will  estimate empirically the 
model by using National Social Economic Survey (Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, 
SUSENAS) and Cost of Living Survey (Survei Biaya Hidup) data. Third, by using the 
estimated CV and EV, we will simulate the impacts of the energy subsidy removal on 
the households’ welfare. The CV and EV can be considered as the compensation 
should be given to the poor households. 
 
1. Introduction  
Indonesia has a long history about energy - electricity and fuel- subsidy. The subsidy 
has become “political commodity” –for example in presidential campaign, political 
campaign, parliament discussion, etc- since it has played important roles in the 
societies, not only for consumption but also production and distribution. As a result, 
economic considerations of the subsidy are frequently disobeyed. However, many 
studies show that the subsidy has been misallocated. It is about the “fairness problem” 
of the energy subsidy. Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs of Indonesia 
(2008) showed that subsidy has been the riches’ crowd pleaser, that is, the distribution 
of fuel subsidy is skewed to wealthy households. The Ministry showed that the top 
40% of wealthy households enjoyed 70% of the subsidies while the bottom 40% of 
low income households benefited only 15% of the subsidies. World Bank (2009) 
showed similar result from a survey conducted in 2005, the richest 40% of households 
enjoyed 60% of the subsidy. Recent result from World Bank (2011) suggests that 50% 
of wealthy households consumed 84% of subsidized fuel with the top 10% consuming 
40% of total subsidy. In contrast, the bottom 10% only consumed less than 1% of total 
subsidy. Further analysis suggests that two-third of poor households do not consume 
fuel at all.  
Moreover, energy subsidy has been imposing persistent pressure on Government of 
Indonesia (GoI) fiscal aspects. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2010) 
recorded increasing trend gasoline subsidy expenditure in the last decade. The revised 
expenditures for subsidy in 2011 accounted for Rp129.7 trillion, higher than the 
planned Rp 95.9 trillion. The projected realization of fuel subsidy expenditure until the 
end of 2011, however, amount to Rp160 trillion. The fuel and electricity subsidy has 
also hamper the development of other alternate energies. 
Indonesia has faced several national energy problems (Djamaludin, 2012). First, 
national productions of oil and gas have decreased since the “oil boom” (Booth, 1992) 
in 1977. Indonesia has national capacity of production only less than 1 million barrel 
per day, meanwhile national consumption has reached around 1.3 million barrel per 
day. This yields an increase trend in imports of oil.  Indonesia established Law No. 
22/2001 on Oil and Gas which is addressed to give legal foundations for rearranging 
and re-managing national oil and gas sector. Second, the availability of national energy 
in Indonesia is dominantly determined by global market situation, especially 
international crude price (ICP). Currently, more than 90 percent energy in Indonesia 
is based on fossil energy, in which 54.4 percent, 26.5 percent and 14.1 percent are from 
oil, gas, and coal, respectively. Third, economic and population growth requires the 
availability of national electricity energy. Assuming constant growth of 7 percent, the 
demand on electricity is predicted around 40,000 MW in 2020. The total existing 
electricity supply is 25,218 MW (21,769 MW by PLN and 3,450 MW by private 
institution) from generators which are mainly operated by using oil. 
The discussion on energy subsidy removal and reallocation has emerged in the 
Indonesian parliament, government and societies. Widodo et al (2012) give some 
policy recommendations on the fuel subsidy removal and reallocation.  First, the 
removal of fuel subsidy can affect the Indonesian economy through aggregate demand 
side (consumption. investment, government expenditure and net-export, which may 
result in demand-pull inflation) and aggregate supply side (cost of production, which 
may cause cost-push inflation).  For the reasons of long-term efficiency, competitive 
advantage, and manageable economic, social and political instability, the GoI should 
have a clear long-term “scheduled” and “gradual” program of fuel subsidy reduction, 
and not the “big-bang” total removal of the fuel subsidy.  Second, the GoI could 
consider a certain amount of subsidy which is adjusted with the increase of government 
fiscal capacity and let the domestic fuel price fluctuated as the ICP fluctuated. Societies 
(both domestic consumers and producers) will learn rationally and adjust logically 
with the fluctuation of domestic fuel price.  Third, the GoI should not consider the 
“sectoral approach” to reallocate the fuel subsidy. It analysis proves the impact of 
reallocation to four targeted sectors would bring relatively smaller positive effect than 
the negative effects of fuel subsidy removal.  The GoI should consider programs such 
as “targeted fuel subsidy” to correct the misallocation the fuel subsidy (i.e. subsidy for 
the poor).  As the poor will be affected most, the GoI should consider continuing 
compensation programs for the poor (example: Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) or 
direct transfer) which take into account regional perspectives. It is predicted that the 
energy subsidy removal will lead to inflation which harm poor household’s welfare. 
Therefore, the study on the impact of the “scheduled-gradual” energy subsidy removal 
on the Indonesian households’ welfare is extremely crucial. It is believed that energy 
subsidy removal will lead to inflation; hence it will burden the society especially the 
poor households.      This paper aims to analyze the impacts of energy subsidy removal 
on the households’ welfare in Indonesia.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
This paper will estimate the measurement of household welfare-change and then use 
the estimation for analyzing the welfare impact of price changes due to such shocks 
i.e government policies, fuel and electricity subsidy removals. Figure 1 shows the 
theoretical framework of this paper. The welfare analysis in this paper is mainly 
derived from the household consumption. Theoretically, the household demand for 
goods and services is a function of prices and income (by definition of Marshallian 
demand function). Therefore, some changes in income and prices of goods and 
services will directly affect the number of goods and services and indirectly affect 
household welfare. 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Estimating Demand, Indirect Utility and Expenditure Function of Energy 
To get the measurement of welfare change, we have to estimate the household 
expenditure function. For that purpose, some steps should be followed. Firstly, the 
household utility function should be established. In this paper, the household’s utility 
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas function which can derive the Linear 
Expenditure System of demand (LES) (Stone, 1954). This assumption is taken because 
the LES is suitable for the household consumption/demand1. LES is widely used for 
some reasons (Intriligator et al 1996: 255). LES has a straightforward and reasonable 
interpretation and it is suitable for the household consumption/demand. LES is one of 
                                                     
1 For detailed information, see Barten (1977), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Philips (1993) and Deaton (1986). 
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the few systems, which automatically satisfy all theoretical restrictions2. In addition, 
it can be derived from a specific utility function3. Secondly, the LES of household 
demand can be estimated by using available data. Therefore, the household 
(Marshallian and Hicksian) demand functions for each food commodity and service 
can be found. From the estimated demand function, we can derive the household’s 
indirect utility and expenditure function.  Finally, for the purpose of policy analysis 
the welfare change can be measured by comparing the household expenditure ‘pre-
shock’ and ‘post-shock’ or ‘before’ and ‘after’ implementation of a specific 
government policy. These stages will be expressed in the next paragraphs. 
To measure the welfare change, we have to estimate the household expenditure 
function. To do that some steps should be followed. Firstly, the household utility 
function should be established. And in this study, the household’s utility function is 
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas which can derive the Linear Expenditure System of 
demand (Stone, 1954). This assumption is taken because the Linear Expenditure 
System (LES) is suitable for the household food consumption/demand4. Secondly, the 
Linear Expenditure System of household demand can be estimated by using available 
data. Therefore the household demand function (Marshallian and Hicksian) for each 
food commodity can be found. From the estimated demand function, we can derive 
the household indirect utility and expenditure function.  Finally, the welfare change 
can be measured by comparing the household expenditure pre-crisis and post-crisis to 
get the same utility (welfare). These stages will be expressed in the next paragraphs. 
 
Marshallian Demand System of Energy 
                                                     
2 Economic theory suggests that the demand functions must satisfy certain restrictions i.e. budget 
constraint condition, two homogeneity conditions (absence of money illusion and homogeneous degree 
zero), Slutsky condition (negativity and symmetry conditions) , aggregation condition (Engel and 
Cournot aggregation conditions) (Widodo, 2005).  
3 The specific utility function from which the linear expenditure system can be derived is the Stone-
Geary utility function (also called the Klein-Rubin utility function). This utility actually is a modified 
Cobb-Douglas utility function.  
 
4 For detailed information, see Barten (1977), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Philips (1993) and Deaton (1986). 
 
In this study, it is assumed that the rural and urban households have a utility function 
following the more general Cobb-Douglas. Stone (1954) made the first attempt to 
estimate a system equation explicitly incorporating the budget constraint, namely the 
Linear Expenditure System (LES). In the case of developing countries, this system has 
been used widely in the empirical studies in India by some authors (Pushpam and 
Ashok (1964), Bhattacharya (1967), Joseph (1968), Ranjan (1985), Satish and Sanjib 
(1999)). 
Formally the individual household’s preferences defined on n goods are characterized 
by a utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form. Klein and Rubin (1948) formulated 
the LES as the most general linear formulation in prices and income satisfying the 
budget constraint, homogeneity and Slutsky symmetry. Basically, Samuelson (1948) 
and Geary (1950), derived that the LES representing the utility function: 
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 is product operator 
 xi is consumption of commodity i 
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o and i  are the parameters of the utility function 
xi
o is minimum quantity of commodity i consumed 
i1,2,3……..n 
The individual household has income M and faces the competitive prices of 
commodity i ie. pi. Therefore, the individual household’s budget constraint becomes 
Mxp i
n
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i
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, where i is 1,2,3……..,n. Two assumptions are imposed on the 
individual household’s budget constraint. The first assumption is that the budget 
constraint is satisfied with equality. This means that the individual household exhausts 
income to maximize utility (non-satiation). The second assumption is that a decision 
on how much income to allocate to total expenditure is independent of the decision on 
how to allocate total expenditure amongst all possible goods (Two-stage budgeting). 
These simplifying assumptions lead to linear estimating equations for food 
consumption and it is shown how the model's structural parameters, i.e. those of 
household preferences, can be identified for use in the calculation of welfare gains and 
losses from price changes. Therefore, the budget constraint can be expressed in the 
matrix form as follows: 
PX = M  ………………………………………………………..………..(2) 
where: 
P is a price vector  p1   p2    p3   ………… pn   
X  is a commodity vector :  
x1 
x2 
x3 
. 
. 
. 
xn 
 
The individual household’s problem is to choose xi that can maximize its utility U(xi) 
subject to its budget constraint. Therefore, the optimal choice of xi is obtained as a 
solution to the constrained optimization problem as follows: 
Max   xxx oii)(U i
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  xi 
Subject to: 
PX  M 
To solve the problem, the Lagrange method can be applied. The Lagrange formula for 
this problem is: 
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Where:  is the Lagrange multiplier. It is interpreted as the marginal utility of income 
showing how much the individual household’s utility will increase if the individual 
household’s income M is increased by $1. 
Take the derivatives and get the first order condition (FOCs): 
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In matrix form (4) and (5) can be represented as follows: 
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Equation (4) tells us that the marginal utility of xi is equal with the marginal utility of 
income multiplied by price of xi.  From (4) and (5), we have n+1 unknown variables 
x1,x2,x3,…….xn,  and n+1 equations.  By applying Cramer’s rule, the unknown 
variables x1, x2, x3,….. xn ,  can be found.: 
A
A
x
1
1
           ..…………………………………………………………(6) 
Where A1 is the determinant of matrix A1 which is constructed from matrix A by 
replacing the first column of A with matrix C. And the A is the determinant of matrix 
A. The other demands (x2, x3, ….. xn and   can be found by applying equation (6) in 
the same way. From (6), we can find the Marshallian (uncompensated) demand 
function for commodity xi as follows: 
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Where: i1,2,……..n 
j1,2,……..n 
Since a restriction that the sum of parameters i equals to one, 
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Equation (7) can be also reflected as the Linear Expenditure System as follows: 
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This equation system (8) can be interpreted as stating that expenditure on good i , given 
as pixi, can be broken down into two components. The first part is the expenditure on 
a certain base amount xi
o of good i , which is the minimum expenditure to which the 
consumer is committed (subsistence expenditure), pixi
o (Stone 1954). Samuelson 
(1948) interpreted xi
o as a necessary set of goods resulting in an informal convention 
of viewing xi
o  as non-negative quantity.  The restriction of xi
o to be non-negative 
values however is unnecessarily strict. The utility function is still defined whenever: 
0xx
o
ii
 . Thus the interpretation of xi
o as a necessary level of consumption is 
misleading (Pollak, 1968). The xi
o  allowed to be negative  provides additional 
flexibility in allowing price-elastic goods. The usefulness of this generality in price 
elasticity depends on the level of aggregation at which the system is treated.  The 
broader the category of goods, the more probable it is that the category would be price 
elastic. Solari (in Howe 1954:13) interprets negativity of  xi
o as superior or deluxe 
commodities.   
 
In order to preserve the committed quantity interpretation of the xi
o’s when some xio  
are negative, Solari (1971) redefines the quantity 
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supernumerary income’ (in contrast to the usual interpretation as supernumerary 
income, regardless of the signs of the xi
o). Then, defining n* such that all goods with 
in* have positive xio  and goods for i>n* are superior with negative xio, Solari 
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xp
o
j
1j
j
n
*


 as supernumerary income and 
xp
o
j
n
1j
j
n
*


 as fictitious income. 
The sum of ‘Solary-supernumerary income’ and fictitious income equals augmented 
supernumerary income. Although somewhat convoluted, these redefinition allow the 
interpretation of ‘Solari-supernumerary income’ as expenditure in excess of the 
necessary to cover committed quantities. 
 
The second part is a fraction i of the supernumerary income, defined as the income 
above the ‘subsistence income’ 
xp
o
j
n
1j
j


 needed to purchase a base amount of all 
goods.  The i are scaled to sum to one to simplify the demand functions. The i is 
referred to as the marginal budget share, i /i. It indicates the proportion in which 
the incremental income is allocated.  
 
As stated above, the Linear Expenditure System (LES) satisfies the condition of: 
(i) homogeneity of degree zero in prices 
(ii) the budget constraint (Engel Aggregation and Cournot Aggregation 
conditions) 
(iii)Slutsky conditions (negativity and symmetry conditions) 
by construction. In combination with fourth i.e. the negative semi-definiteness of he 
Slutsky-Hicks substitution term matrix, they insure that the demand function in 
question is generated by the maximization of utility function. Those conditions lead to 
some restrictions. First, the i’s are positive which is incorporated in the specification 
of the utility function. Second, the sum of the marginal budget share is equal to one 
1
n
1i
i


 that results in demand system of the form shown in equation (8).  Third, 
inferior and complementary goods are not allowed. However, at the high level of 
aggregation employed in this study, this limitation (inferior and complementary) is not 
very restrictive. The higher the level of aggregation, the less likely it is that 
consumption of any given category would decline with the increase in income and 
some i’s could be negative (Howe 1974:18).  
 
The LES is widely used for three reasons. First, it has a straightforward and reasonable 
interpretation. Second, it satisfies the theory of demand (theoretical restrictions). 
Third, it can be derived from a specific utility function (the Stone-Geary or Klein-
Rubin utility function) (Intriligator, Bodkin and Hsiao 1996:255). 
 
Indirect Utility and Expenditure Function of Energy 
The indirect utility function V(P,M) can be found by substituting the Marshallian 
demand xi (equation 7b) into the utility function U(xi) (equation 1). Therefore the 
indirect utility function is: 
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Equation (9) shows the household’s utility function as a function of income and 
commodity prices. By inverting the indirect utility function the expenditure function 
E(P,U), which is a function of certain level of utility and commodity prices, can be 
expressed as follows: 
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Hicksian Demand of Energy 
By derivation the expenditure function E(P,U) with respect to a particular price (using 
the Shephard lemma), the Hicksian demand function can be represented as: 
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Welfare Changes due to Energy Subsidy Removals  
The economic crisis has brought some increases in food prices and decreases of the 
household’s income. The Equivalent Variation (EV) and Compensation Variation 
(CV) will be applied to analyze the impact of the economic crisis on economic welfare.  
The Equivalent Variation (EV) can be defined as the dollar amount that the household 
would be indifferent to in accepting the changes in energy prices and income (wealth). 
It is the change in her/his wealth that would be equivalent to the prices and income 
change in term of its welfare impact (EV is negative if the prices and income changes 
would make the household worse off). Meanwhile, the Compensating Variation (CV) 
measures the net revenue of the planner who must compensate the household for the 
energy prices and income changes, bringing the household back to its welfare (utility 
level) (Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R., 1995:82).  The CV is negative 
if the planner would have to pay household a positive level of compensation because 
the prices and income changes make household worse off). Figure 2 visualizes the EV 
and CV when there is only an increase in price of one good. 
Figure 2. The Compensation Variation and Equivalent Variation 
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EV and CV. Suppose C is composite goods 
and R is energy. Consider a household has 
income M that is spent for Energy (R) and 
Composite goods (C) at price Pc and Pr1, 
respectively. The budget line is shown by 
BL1. Suppose there is an increase in price 
of Energy from Pr1 to Pr2. Therefore, the 
budget line becomes BL2. The household’s 
equilibrium moves from E1 to E2. It derives 
the Marshallian demand curve FB (panel b). 
To get the original utility IC1, the 
household should be compensated such that 
BL2 shifting until coincides with IC1 at E3. 
The compensating variation is represented 
by GH in panel (a) or area Pr2ABPr1 (panel 
b). The equivalent variation is represented 
by HI in panel (a) or Pr2FDPr1 (panel b).  
 
If there are changes in prices and income, the EV and CV can be formulated as: 
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In the context of Linear Expenditure System (LES), equation (12a) and (13a) become: 
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for all i and j 
Where: Po is commodity prices pre-energy subsidy removals 
P’ is commodity prices post- energy subsidy removals
  
p
o
i
 is commodity i prices pre- energy subsidy removals 
p
'
i
 is  commodity i prices post- energy subsidy removals 
U0 is level of utility (welfare) pre- energy subsidy removals 
U’ is level of utility (welfare) post- energy subsidy removals 
M
0  is income (expenditure) pre- energy subsidy removals 
M
' is income (expenditure) post- energy subsidy removals 
 
By knowing the change in prices and income due to the energy subsidy removals, we 
can find the change in welfare measured by CV and EV. The EV and CV indicate 
whether the household is worse off or better off under the economic crisis. This will 
answer the first question of this paper i.e. how much the individual household should 
be compensated due to the economic crisis to hold the same utility (welfare). And by 
comparing the welfare change of the urban and rural individual households, we can 
answer the second question of which society, rural or urban, is most affected by the 
economic crisis. 
 
3. Methodology  
Data  
In estimating the coefficient of LES, this paper uses the secondary data, Social 
Economic National Survey (Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, SUSENAS) and  Living 
Cost Survey (Survey Biaya Hidup) published by Indonesian Bureau for Statistic. This 
paper is based on groups of living expenditures:  
1. Food (x1) 
2. Clothes (x2) 
3. Toiletries (x3) 
4. Housing/shelter (x4) 
5. Health (x5) 
6. Education (x6) 
7. Fuel (x7) 
8. Gas (x8) 
9. Electricity (x9) 
10. Communications (x10) 
 
Estimation 
From econometrics point view, the estimation of a linear expenditure system (LES) 
shows certain complications because, while it is linear in the variables, it is non-linear 
in the parameters, involving the products of i and x
o
i
 in equation systems (2) and (3). 
There are several approaches to estimation of the system (see Intriligator, Baskin, 
Hsaio 1996). Researchers could apply one of the approaches: selecting i and x
o
i
simultaneously by setting up a grid of possible values for the 2n-1 parameters (the –1 
based on the fact that the i sum tends to unity, 1
n
1i
i


) and obtaining that point on 
the grid where the total sum of squares over all goods and all observations is 
minimized.  
The reason is that when estimating a system of equation seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR), the estimation may be iterated. In this case, the initial estimation is 
done to estimate variance. A new set of residuals is generated and used to estimate a 
new variance-covariance matrix. The matrix is then used to compute a new set of 
parameter estimator. The iteration proceeds until the parameters converge or until the 
maximum number of iteration reached. When the random errors follow a multivariate 
normal distribution these estimators will be the maximum likelihood estimators (Judge 
et al 1982:324). 
Rewriting equation (4) to accommodate a sample t=1,2,3,…..T and 10 goods yields 
the following econometric non-linear system: 
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for all i and j    …..…….(11) 
Where: eit is error term equation (good) i at time t. 
Given that the covariance matrix    ee 'tt  where  eeee t10t2t1
'
t
...,.........,  and  is 
not diagonal matrix, this system can be viewed as a set of non-linear seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) equations. There is an added complication, however. 
Because M
10
1i
itit xp 

 the sum of the dependent variables is equal to one of the 
explanatory variables for all t, it can be shown that   0............ eee ot1t2t1   and hence  
is singular, leading to a breakdown in both estimation procedures. The problem is 
overcome by estimating only 9 of the ten equations, say the first nine, and using the 
constraint that 
1
10
1i
i


, to obtain an estimate of the remaining coefficient 10 (Barten, 
1977). 
The first nine equations were estimated using the data and the maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure. The nature of the model provides some guide as to what might 
be good starting values for an iterative algorithm5. Since the constraint the minimum 
observation of expenditure on good i at time t (xit) greater than the minimum 
expenditure x
o
i
 should be satisfied, the minimum xit observation seems a reasonable 
starting value for x
o
i
in iteration process. Also the average budget share, 










T
1t t
itit
1
M
xp
T
, is likely to be a good starting value for i in the iterating process (Griffith et al, 1982). 
It is because the estimates of the budget share i will not much differ with the average 
                                                     
5 For a detailed explanation about iterative algorithms, see Griffith et al 1982. 
 
budget share. In this paper, we use database SUSENAS to derive the coefficients of 
LES: 
Minimum living expenditure i:   where  
Marginal budget share for living expenditure i:  
Elasticity of change ∆Pj with respect to change ∆Pi:
` 
` 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
Table 1 shows the impacts of fuel subsidy reductions (for some scenarios of 
reductions: Rp 500,  Rp 1,000; Rp 1,500 and Rp 2,000) on the poor household’s 
welfare. It also represents the ammount of compesation that at least is given the poor 
household for the same level of welfare (before the fuel subsidy reduction). Fuel 
subsidy reductions Rp 500; Rp 1,000; Rp 1,500 and Rp 2,000 will reduce poor 
household’s welfare by -Rp 25,491; -Rp 50,982; -Rp 76,473 and –Rp 101,964 per 
month per household, respectively. 
Table 1 The Impact of Fuel Subsidy Reduction on Poor Household’s Welfare: 
Some Scenarios (Rp/Month/Household) 
 Fuel Subsidy Reductions: Scenarios 
Measurement Rp 500 Rp 
1,000 
Rp 1,500 Rp 2,000 
1. Direct Impact     
Compensating Variation -2,217 -4,434 -6,651 -8,868 
Equivalent Variation -2,205 -4,390 -6,556 -8,707 
2. Indirect Impact     
Compensating Variation -23,274 -46,548 -69,822 -93,096 
Equivalent Variation -21,770 -40,915 -57,901 -73,085 
3. Total Impact     
Compensating Variation -25,491 -50,982 -76,473 -101,964 
Equivalent Variation -23,976 -45,305 -64,457 -81,792 
 
Table 2 shows the impacts of electricity subsidy reductions (for some scenarios of 
reductions: Rp 50,  Rp 100; Rp 150 and Rp 200) on the poor household’s welfare. It 
also represents the amount of compensation that at least is given the poor household 
for the same level of welfare (before the electricity subsidy reduction). Electricity 
subsidy reductions Rp 50; Rp 100; Rp 150 and Rp 200 will reduce poor household’s 
welfare by -Rp 12,946; -Rp 25,893; -Rp 38,839 and –Rp 51,785 per month per 
household, respectively. 
 
Table 2 The Impact of Electricity Subsidy Reduction on Poor Household’s 
Welfare: Some Scenarios (Rp/Month/Household) 
 Fuel Subsidy Reductions: Scenarios 
Measurement Rp 50 Rp 100 Rp 150 Rp 200 
1. Direct Impact     
Compensating Variation -217 -434 -651 -869 
Equivalent Variation -217 -434 -650 -867 
2. Indirect Impact         
Compensating Variation -12,729 -25,458 -38,187 -50,917 
Equivalent Variation -12,325 -23,897 -34,791 -45,073 
3. Total Impact         
Compensating Variation -12,946 -25,893 -38,839 -51,785 
Equivalent Variation -12,542 -24,331 -35,442 -45,940 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper aims to analyze the impacts of fuel and electricity subsidy removals on the 
households’ welfare in Indonesia. First, we model theoretically the welfare change 
measurement. In this paper, we apply Compensating Variation (CV) under Linear 
Expenditure System (LES). Second, we estimate empirically the model by using 
National Social Economic Survey (Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, SUSENAS) data. 
Third, by using the estimated CV and EV, we simulate the impacts of fuel and 
electricity subsidy removals on the households’ welfare. The CV can be considered as 
the compensation should be given to the poor household. 
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